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Empirical studies send mixed messages as to the 
magnitude of social stigma associated with the take-up 
of social transfers and the impact of stigma on take-
up. These mixed signals may be related to the fact 
that stigma and program participation are likely to be 
jointly determined. If there is a high (low) degree of 
participation in a program, stigma is likely to be lower 
(higher) due at least in part to that high (low) degree 
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persons participate, the less one can single out specific 
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This note suggests this theoretically with a simple model 
showing that we may have in an idealized setting two 
equilibria: one with stigma and zero participation in a 
social program, and one with perfect participation and no 
stigma.Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs†
Jacques Ewoudou t Clarence Tsimpo = Y Quentin Wodon L =
JEL Codes: C72, I38, H53
Key Words: social stigma, program participation, supermodular games, Nash-equilibria.
tJacques Ewoudou: Statistics Canada, Ottawa, K1A OT6, Canada. Email: Jacques.ewoudou@statcan.ca.
= YClarence Tsimpo: World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC, 20433, USA.
Email: Ctsimponkengne@worldbank.org.
L =Quentin Wodon: World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC, 20433, USA.
Email: Qwodon@worldbank.org.
†The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views
of the World Bank, nor those of its Executive Directors or the governments they represent. This
paper is part of a larger work program on Social Exclusion at the Development Dialogue on
Values and Ethics in the Human Development Network at the World Bank.I. Introduction
Substantial work has been done on the take-up of social programs and on the role of
stigma in reducing take-up (for early work in this area see Moﬃtt, 1981, 1983; for literature
reviews, see Andrade, 2002, and Currie, 2004). The evidence from recent empirical studies
is mixed as to whether stigma is pervasive and has an impact on take-up.
On one side of the debate, Hernandez et al. (2007) show that take-up of income support
is lower than take-up of housing beneﬁts and council tax beneﬁts among pensioners in the
United Kingdom in part due to greater stigma associated with income support. Levinson
and Rahardja (2005) use data from the National Survey of America’s Families in the
United States which includes questions on stigma to show that families that do not enroll
in Medicaid tend to have more negative perceptions of welfare, suggesting that stigma
reduces take-up. Riphahn (2001) shows that in Germany more than half of all eligible
households do not claim social assistance transfers in part due to stigma. Henderson et al.
(2006) show that stigma associated with substance abuse makes it diﬃcult in the United
States to identify individuals who could beneﬁt from substance abuse services. Again in
the United States, Stuber and Kronebush (2004) use data from community health center
patients to show that stigma reduces tak e - u po fw e l f a r ea n dM e d i c a i db e n e ﬁts.
On the other side of the debate, there are also several studies that suggest that stigma
may not be as pervasive as commonly believed, or may not have a larger impact on take-
up. For example, using data on the use of food stamps in San Diego County, Breunig
and Dasgupta (2003) do not ﬁnd evidence supporting the assumption of a welfare stigma
associated with the use of food stamps. Similarly, Bingley and Walker (2001) suggest that
in the United Kingdom, stigma associated with housing beneﬁts is low.
The fact that empirical studies send mixe dm e s s a g e sa st ot h em a g n i t u d eo fs t i g m a
and its impact on take-up may be due to diﬀerences in stigma between programs. Such
diﬀerences may in turn be related to the fact that stigma and take-up are likely to be jointly
determined. If there is a high (low) degree of participation in a program, stigma is likely to
be lower (higher) since the more eligible persons participate, the less one can single out and
1stigmatize speciﬁc individuals because they use the program. The objective of this note is to
show this theoretically with a simple game-theoretic model. Our strategy for constructing
our model consists in relying on the properties of supermodular games. It is well known
that games with strategic complementarities may have multiple equilibria and thereby
coordination failures (Diamond, 1982; Cooper and John, 1988). With supermodular games,
there is no need to rely on mixed-strategies for demonstrating the existence of a Nash
equilibrium, since existence of equilibrium in such games does not require continuity of
best response functions (i.e., application of Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem). An implication
of supermodularity is that we can restrict the search for equilibria to pure-strategy Nash-
equilibria since mixed-strategies equilibria when they exist are unstable (Echenique and
Edlin, 2004). Our morel turns out to have two stable equilibria, one with stigma and a
zero take-up rate for social programs, and one with a perfect participation rate and no
stigma at all. The fact that we can have such diﬀerent outcomes may help explain why in
empirical work, stigma and take-up depend a lot on speciﬁc circumstances.
II. The Environment
Consider a community populated by N>0, ex ante individuals. Community members
are equally endowed in the initial situation with a income level y>0, necessary to ﬁnance
their lifestyle. Assume this community experiences idiosyncratic shocks that are suﬃciently
severe and randomly distributed among its members.1 Let ε ∈ {0,1} denote the discrete
states space, where ε =1a n dε = 0 represent respectively states of nature with and
without idiosyncratic shocks.
When aﬀe c t e db yas h o c k,at y p i c a lc o m m u n i t ym e m b e ri ∈ I (where I = {1,....N})
becomes a poor agent; otherwise, she is not. It is assumed that each poor agent is auto-
matically eligible for a social transfer equivalent to the loss due to the shock when it is
requested. Let y with 0 <y< y denote the income level of a poor agent if she does not
1The reader can think of idiosyncratic shocks such as illness, physical disability, death of a family
member, job loss, etc.
2request social transfers. The take-up decision is denoted by si ∈ {0,1},w h e r esi =1a n d
si = 0 respectively mean that the community member i takes the social transfer or not. For
simplicity, it is assumed that si = 1 entails no information or economic cost for the agent.






y if εi =0or (εi =1and si =1 )
y if εi =1and si =0
(II.1)
While there is no economic cost of requesting the transfer, there is a social cost in
the form of stigma. We denote as θi = θ(si/εi) the social prestige of individual i in his
community, conditional upon the idiosyncrat i cs h o c k .W em a k et h ef o l l o w i n ga s s u m p t i o n s :





θ if si =0
α(n) ∈ {θ,θ} if si =1
(II.2)









Assumption 1 states that social prestige associated with si = 0 is higher than when an
agent requests the transfer (si = 1), although the loss in prestige associated with take-up
depends on the participation rate in the program among the eligible population.





θ if n ≥ n∗
θ if n<n ∗
(II.4)
where n∗ ∈ (1/
P
i
εi,1) denotes the critical take-up rate above which take-up does not
reduce social prestige.
As n∗ is bounded below by 1/
P
i
εi, the loss in social prestige is highest for an individual
if that individual is the only one requesting the transfer (then θ(si/1) = θ for that individ-
ual). When n ≥ n∗ there is no more stigma for any of the individuals who requested the
transfer. Next, we assume that all agents derive utility from the net endowment πi ∈ {y,y}
and from the social prestige θi ∈ {θ,θ} through a valued utility function ψ(πi,θ i)w i t h
speciﬁc properties.
Assumption 3. The function ψ : {y,y}×{ θ,θ} → < is strictly increasing in each of its
arguments:
(i) for all π
0 >π , ψ(π
0,θ) − ψ(π,θ) > 0, for each θ ﬁxed
(ii) for all θ
0 >θ ,ψ (π,θ
0) − ψ(π,θ) ≥ 0, for each π ﬁxed.
This assumption of non-satiation implies that given his social prestige, any agent is
always better oﬀ having a high-level of initial income than a lower one (property i),a n d
conversely given his level of initial endowment, any agent in this environment is always
better oﬀ having a higher social prestige than a lower one (property ii).
Assumption 4. The function ψ : {y,y}×{ θ,θ} → < has strictly increasing diﬀerences












4This assumption implies that the incremental gain from a higher level of income is
greater when the agent also has a higher level of social prestige and vice versa. In a
community setting where social prestige matters, this seems to be a reasonable assumption.





− ψ(y,θ) ≥ 0. (II.5)
Assumption 5 states that the loss of social prestige is more costly to the household than
the loss of income.
A. The Take-up Game
We now turn to the analysis of the interactions between agents using standard tools from
game theory. Each agent aﬀected by a idiosyncratic shock is indexed by k,w i t hk ∈ K
(where K = {1,...M})a n dM =
P
i
εi.D e n o t e a s Sk = {0,1} the set of actions that
can be taken by player k ∈ K, with generic element sk ∈ Sk.L e tS = ×k∈KSk represent
the players strategy space. We also deﬁne S−k = ×{j∈K;j6=k}Sj as the set of feasible joint
strategies for all aﬀected agents other than k, with generic element s−k ∈ S−k. A strategy
proﬁle is denoted by s =( sk,s −k) ∈ S. The payoﬀ function of player k who experiences





contrast, the payoﬀ function for an agent aﬀected by a shock who chooses to apply for









if n ≥ n∗
ψ(y,θ) if n<n ∗
(II.6)
In generic terms, the payoﬀ function gk : S → < of a player can be deﬁned as follows:





5A non-cooperative normal-form game is the triple Ω = hK,S,{gk : k ∈ K}i consisting
of a non-empty set of players K,as e tS of players joint decision strategies, and a collection
of payoﬀ functions {gk : k ∈ K}.G i v e nt h a ta l la ﬀected agents have the same strategy set
(S1 = S2 = ...SM), and for all k,j ∈ K, gk(s)=gj(p) for all k 6= j,t h en o r m a lg a m eΩ is
symmetric.2
B. Pure Nash Equilibria
We can deﬁne a Nash equilibria when all aﬀected agents make their take-up decision
simultaneously.
Deﬁnition 1. A pure-strategy proﬁle s∗ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium of Ω if and only if
gk(s∗) ≥ gk(sk,s ∗
−k) for all sk ∈ Sk and all k ∈ K.
Denote as ℵΩ the set of Nash equilibria of the game. Let s1 and s0 be feasible strategy
proﬁles, where s1 (respectively s0) is the strategy proﬁle such that each aﬀected agent
k ∈ K chooses to apply for beneﬁts sk = 1 (respectively not to apply for beneﬁts sk =0 ) .
We can derive the following result which is proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-5, {s1,s 0} ∈ℵ Ω.
Proposition 1 states that the strategy proﬁle where all aﬀected agents decide to apply
for beneﬁts (i.e., s1) and the one where none of them apply (i.e., s0 )b e l o n gt ot h es e to f
pure Nash equilibria of the symmetric game Ω.
Before we proceed to derive further policy implications from the result outlined in
Proposition 1, we must address the question of whether the strategy proﬁles s0 and s1 are
indeed the only stable equilibria of the symmetric game, Ω. After all, there is no a priory
guarantee that a symmetric game with strategic complementarities only has symmetric
equilibria. Therefore to address this issue of whether {s0,s 1} are indeed the only equilibria
of the take-up game, we ﬁrst show that Ω is indeed a supermodular game (as this concept
2Hence, the identity of the players does not matter and we do not need to consider strategy proﬁle
separately.
6is deﬁned and used in Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), also known as a game characterized
by strategic complementarities.
Deﬁnition 2. (Milgrom and Roberts [1990]) Ω is a supermodular game, if for all k,
(i) Sk is a compact subset of <;
(ii) gk is upper semi-continuous in sk, for each ﬁxed s−k
(iii) gk is continuous in s−k for each ﬁxed sk;
(iv) gk has a ﬁnite upper bound;
(v) gk has increasing diﬀerences in (sk,s −k) on Sk × S−k.
In particular, property (v) of Deﬁnition 2 implies that for a player k, the incremental
gain from applying for beneﬁts is higher when the others players also apply for beneﬁts:
for all s0


















k,s −k) − gk (sk,s −k).
To show that the take-up game Ω is supermodular, it suﬃces to prove that properties
(i)-(v)o fD e ﬁnition 2 are satisﬁed. The following Proposition, which is proved in Appendix
B, establishes this result.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-5, the symmetric game Ω,i ss u p e r m o d u l a r .
Proposition 2 in turn implies that conditions underlying Topki’s theorem apply so that
any best response βk(s−k)f o ra g e n tk is increasing in the other agents’ actions. That is,
for all s0
−k >s −k, we have βk(s0
−k) ≥ βk(s−k), where:
βk(s−k) ∈ arg max
sk∈Sk
gk (sk,s −k).
The next proposition derives from the fact that βk(s−k) are increasing. Now, since
βk(s−k) are increasing, to rule out asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria, we show in
7the following Lemma–which we prove in Appendix C–, that community members’ best
reply are single-valued correspondences (i.e., each βk is a function):
Lemma 1. Let βk (s−k)=
©
sk : sk ∈ argmaxsk∈Sk gk (sk,s −k)
ª
, for all k, given s−k.
Then, under Assumptions 1-5, βk (s−k) is a singleton.
Lemma 1 states that players best replies are single-valued. This result, combined with
our above application of Topkis’ theorem rules out the existence of asymmetric pure-
strategy Nash-equilibria for the take-up game. Hence the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-5, {s1,s 0} = ℵΩ.
Proposition 3 states that the strategy proﬁles when either all or none of the agents apply
for beneﬁts are the only pure Nash equilibria. This multiplicity of equilibria suggests a
potential role for a deliberate action to select one of the equilibria. Such deliberate action
is desirable, however, only if the two equilibria can be ranked according to the Pareto
principle. The following Proposition establishes this ranking.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-5, the symmetric pure-strategy s1 Pareto dominates
the proﬁle s0.
Proof: To prove this Proposition, it suﬃces to show that for all k ∈ K,a n df o ra l l
sk ∈ Sk, gk (s1) − gk (s0) > 0. Let ∆k = gk (s1) − gk (s0). From the deﬁnition of the payoﬀ






The result follows from Assumption 3 on the increasing property of the utility function
ψ.
Thus, proposition 4 states that the strategy proﬁle where all aﬀected agents elect to
apply for beneﬁts is strictly preferred to the one where none of them do.
8III. Conclusion
We have provided a simple game-theoretic model to show that in an idealized setting, we
may observe two equilibria in terms of the take-up of social programs by the poor and the
stigma associated to this take-up. If all eligible individuals apply for beneﬁt, there is no
stigma. If none of the individuals apply, the stigma that would be associated with take-up
would be high, and indeed too high for individuals to apply. Real life is obviously much
more complex than our simple model, but the model clearly shows that stigma and take-up
rates are endogenously determined. furthermore, from a policy point of view, it is better
to encourage high take-up rates and thereby eliminate stigma to improve welfare.
9IV. Appendix
A .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
The proof can be divided in two claims:
Claim 1. The strategy proﬁle s1 =( s1
1,...,s1
k,...,s1
M) such that sk =1for all k ∈ K,i sa
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Ω.
Proof: Using (II.7) and Deﬁnition 1 of a Nash equilibrium, it follows that the strategy





− ψ(y,θ) ≥ 0.
Since n∗ ∈ (1/
P
i
εi,1), the result then clearly follows from the increasing property of ψ
.Hence the result.
Claim 2. The strategy proﬁle s0 =( s0
1,...,s0
k,...,s0
M) such that sk =0for all k ∈ K,i sa
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Ω.
Proof: With condition (II.5) in hands, the proof follows in the same manner as in
claim 1. This complete the proof of Proposition 1.
B. Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove proposition 2, ﬁrst, observe that for all k, Sk = {0,1}, is clearly a compact
subset of <, since sk is closed and bounded. Therefore property (i)o fas u p e r m o d u l a r
game is trivially satisﬁed. Second, to establish property (ii)a n d( iii), it suﬃces to prove
the following claim:
Claim 1. For all k ∈ K,t h ef u n c t i o ngk : S → <, is continuous on S, where S = ×k∈Ksk.
Proof. Since sk is ﬁnite for all i, therefore S is also ﬁnite, as the Cartesian product of
a ﬁnite number of ﬁnite sets. Indeed, S has cardinal equal to 2N, which is ﬁnite, since M is
10a ﬁnite number. Therefore, by theorem3, gk is continuous on S. This establishes property
(ii)a n d( iii) of a supermodular game.
Third, to establish property (iv), it suﬃces to prove the following claim:
Claim 2. For all k ∈ K,t h ef u n c t i o ngk : S → <, attains a maximum on S.
Proof. Since the set of feasible joint strategies reduced to S is ﬁnite and has no more
than 2N elements, we also have that gk (S) ⊂ < is also ﬁnite; and ﬁnite subsets of < always
contain their upper and lower bounds. It therefore follows that, gk has a ﬁnite upper bound
on S. This completes the proof of this claim.
Fourth, the following claim establishes property (v).
Claim 3. Under Assumptions 1-5, the function gk : S → < has increasing diﬀerences in
(sk,s −k) on Sk × S−k:f o ra l lk ∈ K,f o ra l ls0


















k,s −k) − gk (sk,s −k)( I V . 1 )
Proof: Let s0
k >s k and s0

















k,s −k) − gk (sk,s −k). (IV.2)
Since sk ∈ {0,1},t a k es0
k =1a n dsk = 0. Then, using deﬁnition of gk(.), it can be





















3Theorem (continuity with opened sets): Any function deﬁned on a ﬁnite set is continuous.
11Since s0
−k >s −k,i t sf o l l o w st h a tn0
−k >n −k by construction. Now, if n0
−k ≤ n∗ or





− Γ(n−k) = 0 and we reach a contradiction.
Next, if n−k ≤ n∗ ≤ n0





− ψ(y,θ) < 0. (IV.4)
Due to the strict increasing property of the utility function ψ, inequality (IV.4) never
hold. Once more, we reach a contradiction. Hence the result. This complete the proof of
Proposition 2.
C .P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .



















. Suppose by way of contradiction














Since Sk = {0,1},t a k esL
k =0a n dsH
k = 1. Then, we can rewrite (IV.5) as follows:
gk (0,b s−k)=gk (1,b s−k),








































> 0. Hence the
result.
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